Abuse of a Dominant Position in Türkiye: What Foreign Companies Need to Know

If your company holds a strong position in a Turkish market, the law does not punish you for being big or successful. Under the Turkish competition statute (Rekabetin Korunması Hakkında Kanun No. 4054), holding a dominant position is perfectly lawful. What is prohibited is abusing that position. The line between strong competition and abuse is where foreign firms most often get caught off guard, because conduct that feels like ordinary commercial strategy at headquarters can be read very differently by the Turkish Competition Authority. This guide explains, in plain terms, how dominance is assessed, which conducts are treated as abuse, and what the exposure looks like for a foreign company with a meaningful share of a Turkish market.

The short answer: dominance is legal, abuse is not

Turkish competition law is built on one core idea here: a company is free to grow, win customers and hold a leading position, but once it is dominant it carries a special responsibility not to distort competition through its conduct. This rule lives in Article 6 of the Law on the Protection of Competition (Rekabetin Korunması Hakkında Kanun No. 4054), the statute administered by the Turkish Competition Authority (Rekabet Kurumu) and its decision-making body, the Competition Board (Rekabet Kurulu).

So two separate questions matter, and they are easy to confuse:

• Are you dominant? This is a status. It is not, by itself, an offence.
• Did you abuse that dominance? This is about conduct. Only abusive conduct breaches Article 6.

A foreign company can have the largest position in its Turkish segment and never breach the law, provided it competes on the merits. The risk appears when a strong position is used to shut rivals out or to extract terms from customers that competition would not allow.

What "dominant position" actually means (hâkim durum)

A dominant position (hâkim durum) is, in plain words, a market position strong enough that the company can behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors and customers, for example by setting prices or terms without being effectively disciplined by them. The statute frames it as the power to determine economic parameters such as price, supply and output without meaningful constraint.

The key point that surprises many foreign businesses: dominance is not decided by market share alone. A high share is an indicator, sometimes a strong one, but it is the starting point of the analysis, not the end of it.

Step one: defining the relevant market

Before anyone asks whether you are dominant, the Authority defines the relevant market (ilgili pazar). This has two dimensions:

• Relevant product market: which goods or services genuinely compete with yours because customers would switch between them.
• Relevant geographic market: the area where the conditions of competition are similar, which may be all of Türkiye or a region.

How wide or narrow the market is defined often decides the whole case. A product that looks like one of many on a global view can be the only real option inside a narrowly defined Turkish market.

Step two: assessing market power

Once the market is defined, the Authority weighs market power using factors such as your share and its stability over time, barriers to entry and expansion, the strength of competitors, buyer power on the other side, control of essential inputs or infrastructure, and financial and technological advantages. A company with a moderate share can be dominant where entry is hard; a company with a high share may face real constraints. The conclusion depends on the facts.

Exclusionary abuse: conduct that targets rivals

The first family of abuse is exclusionary conduct, behaviour that forecloses or weakens competitors rather than competing with them on price and quality. Article 6 lists examples, and the Competition Board has applied them across many sectors. Common forms include the following.

Refusal to deal

A dominant firm that controls an input, network or facility that rivals genuinely need may, in some circumstances, be obliged not to refuse access without an objective justification. A refusal that has no purpose other than to keep a competitor out of a downstream market can be treated as abuse.

Predatory pricing

Cutting prices below a relevant measure of cost to drive out a competitor, with the prospect of recouping later, can be abusive when done by a dominant firm. The difficulty for global pricing teams is that an aggressive promotion that is harmless from a small player can be read as predation from a dominant one.

Exclusivity and loyalty-inducing arrangements

Exclusive purchasing obligations, loyalty rebates and conditional discounts that lock customers in and deny rivals a viable route to market can amount to abuse when imposed by a dominant firm. The same rebate that is pro-competitive from a marginal supplier may be foreclosing from a dominant one.

Margin squeeze

Where a dominant firm is active both upstream (supplying an input) and downstream (competing with its own customers), setting the input price so high relative to the downstream price that an equally efficient competitor cannot make a margin can be treated as abuse.

Exploitative abuse: conduct that targets customers

The second family is exploitative conduct, where a dominant firm uses its position to extract terms from customers that effective competition would not permit. The main forms are:

• Excessive pricing: charging prices that bear no reasonable relation to economic value, in a way only sustainable because competitive pressure is absent.
• Discriminatory pricing or terms: applying different conditions to equivalent transactions with different trading parties, placing some at a competitive disadvantage without objective justification.

Exploitative cases are factually demanding and often turn on cost and benchmark evidence, but they are squarely within Article 6. Pricing and discount frameworks that treat similar Turkish customers very differently, or that price into a captive Turkish market well above comparable markets, deserve a closer look before they are deployed.

The exposure for foreign companies with strong Turkish positions

If your company is found to have abused a dominant position, the consequences run on several tracks at once. We keep the figures qualitative here on purpose, because the exact rates and bases are set by the statute and secondary legislation and should be confirmed for your specific facts.

• Administrative fines: the Competition Board can impose fines calculated by reference to the undertaking's turnover. Managers and employees who played a determining role can also face separate fines. The applicable rates and the relevant turnover base must be checked against the current legislation.
• Behavioural and structural remedies: the Board can order conduct to stop and impose obligations to restore competition, such as granting access or changing terms.
• Private damages: Act No. 4054 allows parties harmed by a competition violation to claim compensation before the civil courts, and the statute provides for enhanced damages in defined circumstances.
• Reputational and commercial fallout: investigations are demanding, can involve dawn raids and information requests, and decisions are published.

There is also a settlement procedure (uzlaşma) and a commitment mechanism within the system, which in suitable cases can change how a matter is resolved. Whether either is appropriate is a strategic judgement that depends on the facts of your case.

Whether any specific conduct crosses the line from vigorous competition into abuse is a fact-specific assessment, and we cannot predict how the Authority or a court will decide a given matter. This article is general information, not legal advice on your situation.

How to reduce your risk in practice

You do not need to weaken your competitive position to stay on the right side of Article 6. You need to know where you may be dominant and apply more care there. A workable approach:

• Map where you may be dominant. Identify the Turkish product and geographic markets where your share and the surrounding conditions could support a finding of dominance.
• Pressure-test pricing and rebates. Review below-cost pricing, loyalty and conditional discounts, and large customer-specific differences in those markets.
• Check exclusivity and access. Re-examine exclusive supply or purchasing terms and any refusal to supply inputs that rivals genuinely need.
• Localise global policies. Treat centrally designed schemes as drafts to be checked against Turkish rules before they apply locally.
• Document objective justifications. Where conduct has a legitimate commercial rationale, record it at the time, not after a question arises.

If you would like the conduct in your strongest Turkish markets reviewed against Article 6 of Act No. 4054, our competition team can assess your position and advise on the practical steps that fit your business.

Frequently asked questions